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landlord upon notice to the tenant that that it is for he latter's benefit
and to minimize the damages, and that the landlord does not relinquish
his claim to the rent.9
*CARL F. ZEIDLER
Pleading: Joinder of Parties.
Ernest v. Schmidt, 227 N.W., Vol. 1, page 26 (advanced sheets).
The decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the rehearing of
Ernest v. Schmidt implies an interesting analysis of Sec. 263.04 of the
Wisconsin Statutes of 1927 which provides that all causes of action
stated in a complaint must effect all of the parties to the action. The
court reverses their edict on the first hearing of the same case, Ernest v.
Schmidt, 223 N.W. 558; but before dwelling on the reversal it would
be well to review the facts brought out in the first hearing.
The defendants were stockholders in The Elmwood Company, en-
gaged in the development of certain land in Texas. The corporation
ran short of funds, and the defendants besought the plaintiff to lend
them money in order that they might continue the project. The agree-
ment stated among other things that in consideration for such loan the
defendants would become individually liable for the amount of $11,500,
and that each of them would pay his pro rata share of $11,500 plus
interest if the plaintiff was forced to buy up the land to protect his
loan.
The defendants issued a trust deed on all their real estate to secure
$30,000 in notes. When these notes fell due, the defendants being un-
able to pay, the trustees foreclosed on their deeds and put the land up
for public sale. The plaintiff forced to bid in at the sale to protect
his loan, to which effect he notified the defendants. Receiving no reply
he organized a corporation to buy up the land, the plaintiff himself
becoming the owner of 233 Y of 500 shares of no par value capital
stock which represented an ownership in the land sufficient to cover
the loan made to the defendants. When the plaintiff offered the stock
certificates to the defendants, they refused to take them, and he sued
on the written agreement joining the subscribers as defendants. The
defendants demurred on the ground of sec. 263.04 "that the causes of
action in a complaint must effect all the parties," and that as the agree-
ment created a several obligation, the plaintiff would have to proceed
against them separately. The Supreme Court at this time decided to
sustain the demurrer, explaining that due to the indefiniteness of the
complaint and the doubtful intent of the agreement, to allow a joinder of
parties would mean the emasculation of Sec. 263.04.
'Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 27 Pac. 369.
Higgins v. Street, 19 Okla. 45, 92 Pac. 153, 14 Ann. Gas. 1086.
NOTES AND COMMENT
On rehearing the case, however, the court reversed its decision and
held that the defendants could be jointed in the same action according
to Sec. 260.17 which says, "Parties severally liable on the same instru-
ment, of obligation .... may all or any of them be joined in the same
action at the option of the plaintiff ..... " This did not give its reason-
ing in preferring the above statute over 263.04, but De Groot v. Peoples
Bank, 183 Wis. 594, seems to give us a clue to the rule followed by
the court.
The decision in this case hinged on the validity of a chattel mortgage
and the interpretation of a statute which provides for the joinder of
defendants on different causes of action where there is a possibility of
alternative relief, although recovery against one is inconsistent as
against the other. The plaintiffs sued the defendant vendors on the
breach of an implied warranty and in the same complaint they joined
the defendant bank on a cause of action for the enforcement of an
alleged invalid chattel mortgage against them. Defendants demurred
to the complaint on the ground of Sec. 2647 (now 263.04). But the
Supreme Court ruled against them maintaining that the complaint was
sufficient under Sec. 2603 (1927 Stats. 260.11).
Justice Owen in discussing the apparent contradiction of the two sec-
tions, gives the following interpretation:
"Both sections were placed in their present form by chap. 219, Laws
of 1915. No recent act has gone so far in banishing technicalities,
liberalizing court procedure, and providing a short cut for the admin-
istration of justice. It broadens the scope of Sec. 2647 by striking out
the specifications of causes of action that might be united and made
it applicable to all causes of action. It expressly added to Sec. 2603 the
provision that 'a plaintiff may joint as defendants persons against whom
the right of alternative relief is alleged to exist, although the recovery
against one is inconsistent with recovery against the other.' These
quoted words might as well have been omitted if the causes of action
so united must effect all the parties to the action.
"Chap. 219 of the Laws of 1915 was decided and affirmative effort
in the interests of simplified and direct judicial procedure. It should
be construed so as to promote rather than to defeat that purpose. Sec.
2603 deals with limited causes of action, those in which alternative
relief may be demanded. Upon familiar rules of construction its pro-
visions must prevail with reference to such special causes over the more
general provisions of Sec. 2647. This does not emasculate Sec. 2647.
It is believed that this construction gives full force to the legislative
intent."
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Now then, to return to Ernest v. Schmidt1 and the application of
206.17 (Sec. 2609, Laws of 1915). Cannot we substitute it in the
above opinion for Sec. 2603? If there can be a joitider of parties where
the recovery against one is inconsistent with recovery as against the
other, why cannot there be a joinder of the defendants? Cannot Sec.
260.17 be classed with Sec. 260.11 The decision on the rehearing of
Ernest v. Schmidt seems to answer these questions in the affirmative;
and when looking at in in conjunction with the opinion in De Groot v.
Peoples Bank the rule as apparently laid by the Supreme Court, is that
See. 263.04 is a general statute applying to all cases where relief is
sought and the obligations of the charged parties are not as defined by
Sec. 260.11 and Sec. 260.17.
FRANCIs ACKERMAN
Pledges: Pledge Agreements: Jury Questions.
In the action of Rezash V. Bank of Two Rivers1 the appellant desired
to recover of the respondent bank $7,000 and interest alleged to have
been lost by the negligence of the bank in its handling of a security of
appellant pledged to the bank.
Appellant on August 15, 1925, delivered to the bank, as collateral
security for a line of credit extended by the bank to him, an interim
receipt from an investment house in Chicago, by which the investment
company undertook to deliver to the appellant $7,000 worth of speci-
fied building bonds. The bank at the same time prepared a pledge
agreement describing the collateral, and, as the interim receipt expressly
provided that it was to be surrendered on delivery of the bonds, in-
corporated in the pledge agreement an authorization to the bank to
surrender the interim receipt for the permanent bonds,-which appel-
lant signed. The bank requested no other or further authority than
what it incorporated in the pledge agreement.
The whole transaction was for the benefit of the appellant. The
bank received no consideration because of it.
By the terms of the interim receipt, the said investment company
undertook to deliver $7,000 worth of the specified building bonds, "when
as and if received in definite form". The bank concededly never made
an inquiry to ascertain when the bonds became available in a deliverable
state. The uncontroverted fact was that the bonds had been put into
a deliverable state August 1, 1925, by the common modern device of
trustee's interim certificates and that practically all of the seven mil-
lion dollar issue was in the first instance sold and delivered in that form;
'227 N.W. Vol. 1, p. 26 (advance sheets).
'227 N.W. 4; - Wis. -.
